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39 
Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: 
An Anti-Essentialist Proposal 
Leigh Goodmark  
In her keynote address to the ninth annual Washington University 
School of Law Access to Equal Justice Colloquium, Professor Jane 
Spinak suggested five questions that we should ask about Family 
Court reform efforts:  
What do we say about the reform work we do and to what 
degree is what we say accurate? How does the way in which 
we talk about family court reform implicate our analysis of 
what we are achieving? How does our place or our role within 
the system affect our perceptions of reform? What limits our 
willingness and ability to apply rigorous evaluative techniques 
to determine whether we are reaching our goals? And if we are 
failing, can we acknowledge failure and learn from it?
1
  
One could pose the same questions about the development of the 
legal response to violence between intimate partners. For the 
purposes of this essay, I focus particularly on what I view as a central 
failure in domestic violence law and policy reform—the creation of a 
body of law and set of policies based on outmoded notions of what 
domestic violence is, the identities of the women who experience 
violence,
2
 the identities of their partners, and what such women need 
 
  Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Center on Applied Feminism, University 
of Baltimore School of Law. This essay was adapted from my remarks at the Washington 
University School of Law Ninth Annual Access to Equal Justice Colloquium and will be further 
expanded for inclusion in my forthcoming book, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM. My thanks to Professors Annette Appell and Adele 
Morrison for the invitation to participate in the conference and to Professors Jane Spinak and 
Adele Morrison for their help in shaping this piece. Evan Koslow, as ever, provided exceptional 
research assistance. All controversial opinions and mistakes are, of course, my own. 
 1. Jane Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right between Rhetoric and Reality, 
31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 11 (2009). 
 2. In this Article, I have chosen not to use the terms ―victim,‖ ―survivor,‖ or ―battered 
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and want. I believe that the theoretical underpinnings of domestic 
violence law and policy largely are to blame for this excessively 
narrow and problematic view of domestic violence.  
Domestic violence law and policy reflects the influence of 
dominance feminism, the brand of feminism in vogue in the late 
1970s and 1980s, when state responses to domestic violence 
mushroomed.
3
 Dominance feminism posits that in a male-dominated 
society, women exist as sexual objects to be exploited by men at their 
pleasure.
4
 Laws, drafted, passed, and interpreted largely by men, have 
actualized the goal of the dominators—the continued subordination 
of women.
5
 Dominance feminism advocates the redeployment of the 
law to alleviate women‘s subordinated status.6 In the realm of 
intimate partner violence, dominance feminism views physical 
violence as a state-sanctioned manifestation of men‘s dominance over 
women and casts all women who experience violence in the role of a 
stereotypical victim: weak, passive, and powerless.
7
 Dominance 
feminists argue that to counteract this domination, the state must 
respond in a way that the state believes will ensure the victim‘s 
safety, regardless of individual women‘s goals.8 
Anti-essentialist feminism critiques this view of women‘s place in 
the world, arguing that the experiences of all women cannot be 
 
woman,‖ all of which reduce women down to the experience of violence ad ignore other facets 
of their lives. BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 87–88 
(1989). Instead, I use the terms ―women who have been battered‖ or ―women who experience 
violence.‖ These terms are intended to bring attention to the violence women face without 
describing them solely as a product of that violence. This construction is consistent with my 
belief that too much of domestic violence law and policy reduces women who experience 
violence to stereotypes and accordingly narrows the law and policy options they are offered. 
Reimagining domestic violence law requires us to see women who have been battered as 
individuals with varying goals, desires, and constraints; using this construction, while less 
compact, is a first step in that process. 
 3. Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 4. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 45 (2d ed. 2003). 
 5. Id. at 46. 
 6. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
105 (1987). 
 7. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM 346 (2006). 
 8. Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 3. 
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distilled down to this victim-centered, über-woman view.
9
 Domestic 
violence does not transform every woman who experiences it into a 
stereotypical victim, nor should this victim stereotype shape domestic 
violence law and policy.
10
 Instead, anti-essentialist feminism compels 
us to delve into the complexities of the lives of individual women and 
consider the totality of who they are, rather than reducing them to 
their lowest common denominator—their common experience with 
domestic violence. Anti-essentialist feminism reminds us that women 
who experience domestic violence are more than the experience of 
that violence. They are rich, poor, middle class, African-American, 
Latina, Asian, white, Native American, immigrant, disabled, able-
bodied, gay, straight, transgendered, rural, urban, self-defensive, 
aggressive, frightened, and angry. They have different goals, 
aspirations, concerns, and priorities. The solutions we develop need 
to be attentive to those complexities. To that end, this essay suggests 
a number of anti-essentialist principles for reinventing domestic 
violence law and policy, all of which should guide the 
reconsideration of the legal response to domestic violence and 
underpin concrete choices about policy, legislation, and systemic 
reform. These principles are not exhaustive, but serve as a jumping-
off point for further discussion about how an anti-essentialist feminist 
response could transform domestic violence law and policy. 
I. DIVORCE UNIVERSALIZING THEORIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
FROM THE LAW 
Lenore Walker‘s cycle of violence was once the primary 
theoretical model used to describe domestic violence.
11
 Since 1979, 
Walker‘s paradigm has been used in basic domestic violence training 
to explain how domestic violence should look: a tension-building 
phase, followed by an acute battering incident, culminating in a 
honeymoon period.
12
 Without some intervention, the cycle repeats 
 
 9. NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 26 
(2006). 
 10. See generally Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? 
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008). 
 11. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55–70 (1979). 
 12. Id. at 55. 
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itself incessantly, with the physical violence coming more quickly 
and growing more intense over time.
13
 Walker‘s theory is compelling 
for a number of reasons. It is a simple narrative that accurately 
depicts the behavior of some women who are battered, occurring 
frequently enough for judges to recognize and vest credibility in it. 
The narrative has a clear villain and victim, which allows for easy 
categorization of the parties to an action. The narrative suggests a 
solution (interrupt the cycle to stop the violence); and casts the judge 
in the role of the hero who can, in fact, break the cycle by separating 
the parties. The theory is consistent with a dominance feminist view 
of victims as passive non-actors: cycles are inevitable, something that 
a person unintentionally becomes part of and cannot easily escape. 
The cycle, like a force of nature, is more powerful than the individual 
caught up in it. 
For years, actors within the legal system were told to look for the 
characteristic phases described by Walker, the presence of which 
signaled domestic violence.
14
 The problem, of course, was the 
converse—if the cycle was not present, no domestic violence was 
occurring. Walker herself never made this argument, but the ubiquity 
of the cycle of violence choked out other discourse within the legal 
system about how to identify violence in intimate relationships, 
entrenching the cycle of violence as the benchmark against which 
women‘s claims of violence would be tested.15  
Walker also introduced the legal system to the notion that women 
who have been battered suffer from learned helplessness.
16
 Walker 
explained the inability of women to escape abusive relationships as a 
function of their repeated experiences of powerlessness in the face of 
 
 13. Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski, Dynamics and Risk Factors in Partner 
Violence, in PARTNER VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF RESEARCH 1, 3 
(Jana L. Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998).  
 14. See Megan G. Thompson, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence: 
Reformulating the Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REV. 599, 614 (2007). See generally Laurie 
S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the 
Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 197–98, 206–08, 232 (2008) (describing the 
use of Walker‘s theories in court). 
 15. Legal system actors are still advised to look for the cycle of violence, though in a 
more measured way. See, e.g., Jennifer Gentile Long, Prosecuting Intimate Partner Sexual 
Assault, PROSECUTOR, Apr./May/June 2008, at 20. 
 16. WALKER, supra note 11, at 43. 
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battering.
17
 Like the dogs in Martin Seligman‘s behavioral 
psychology experiments, Walker argued, when women were beaten 
enough, they learned that no effort they made to stop the violence 
would succeed.
18
 As a result, women who experienced violence 
became passive and weak, unable to leave their violent partners.
19
 
The description of women who have been battered as weak, passive 
non-actors has been enshrined in the law through Battered Woman 
Syndrome, a diagnosis-turned-excuse for women who fight back 
against their abusers.
20
 
At the same time that Walker‘s work was exerting such a 
profound influence over domestic violence law, others were 
scrutinizing Walker‘s formulation and suggesting alternate theories 
of domestic violence. Walker‘s own work failed to support the 
ubiquity of the cycle of violence or the universality of women‘s 
feelings of helplessness.
21
 Advocates and scholars questioned the 
utility of a theory that accounted for the real-life experiences of so 
few women who have been battered. Edward Gondolf and Ellen 
Fisher recast women who experience violence as survivors struggling 
actively against their abusers.
22
 Evan Stark introduced the concept of 
coercive control and contended that the physical violence that was the 
trough of the woman‘s experience in Walker‘s theories might 
actually be the least harmful type of abuse a woman experiences.
23
 
The real harm in domestic violence, Stark argued, was less the 
physical violence done and more the deprivation of liberty that is at 
the heart of coercive control.
24
 Michael Johnson distinguished among 
types of violence, categorizing violence between partners as intimate 
terrorism, situational couple violence, violent resistance, and mutual 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. at 45–47. 
 19. See id. at 48. 
 20. See generally Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 21. See David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age 
of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (1997) (arguing that Walker‘s research does not support her 
conclusions). 
 22. EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 3 (1988). 
 23. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 
5 (2007). 
 24. See id. at 380–82. 
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violent control.
25
 Intimate terrorism encompasses most (but not all) of 
Stark‘s theory of coercive control and largely involves male violence 
against women;
26
 situational couple violence refers to violence that is 
not meant to control a partner‘s actions, but arises from a specific 
conflict relationship and is used by both genders;
27
 violent resistance 
describes the actions of women who fight back against their intimate 
terrorist partners;
28
 and mutual violent control exists when both 
partners use violence to exert control over the other partner.
29
 
Johnson suggests that each of these types of violence might call for 
different policy responses, given the significant differences in what 
motivates the violence.
30
 Even Lenore Walker has revisited and 
refined her earlier work on learned helplessness.
31
 The social science 
research regarding intimate partner violence is incredibly dynamic; 
undoubtedly, scholars and researchers will continue to posit and 
refine theories about what domestic violence is and how it affects its 
victims.  
This theoretical evolution is precisely why creating law and policy 
around such theories is so problematic. Domestic violence is not a 
monolith explicable by a seamless, overarching theory. Such theories 
are seldom expansive enough to account for the experiences of the 
vast array of women who experience violence. Their uncritical 
acceptance, however, can bar women who do not conform to what is 
expected under those theories from accessing the legal system.
32
 
Experts in the field have largely abandoned the theory of learned 
helplessness and its conception of women who experience violence 
as passive non-actors.
33
 Those same stereotypes remain codified as 
 
 25. MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, 
VIOLENT RESISTANCE AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 6 (2008). 
 26. Id. at 6–8. 
 27. Id. at 11. 
 28. Id. at 10. 
 29. Id. at 12. 
 30. Id. at 72. 
 31. See generally LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 69–84 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 32. See, e.g., Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?, supra note 
10, at 76–77 (explaining that battered women who fight back may not be viewed as ―true 
victims‖). 
 33. See JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 48–49. 
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law in many states nonetheless.
34
 Courts and legislatures simply 
cannot keep pace with the social science research on domestic 
violence. 
Domestic violence is as individual as each woman who comes 
before a court seeking assistance. Too often, though, judges fail to 
see the individuals for the theory that was meant to explain the 
violence they experience. Worse, judges sometimes are constrained 
by existing statutes and case law, which prevent consideration of a 
woman‘s experience of violence if it fails to conform to the law‘s 
conception of domestic violence. Enshrining theories of domestic 
violence in the law ignores the changing nature of our understanding 
of domestic violence and reifies outdated and problematic notions 
about what violence is and who needs assistance.  
II. ACKNOWLEDGE THE COMPLEXITY OF WHO BATTERED WOMEN 
ARE AND WHAT THEY WANT 
Domestic violence law and policy is grounded in a stereotype: 
―the victim of domestic violence.‖ The ―victim‖ is white, straight, 
middle-class, meek, weak, passive, and dependent.
35
 This stereotype 
poses real problems for women who are not white, middle-class, 
heterosexual, or helpless, but nonetheless seek protection from 
courts.
36
 When women who have been battered fail to conform to the 
stereotype, their credibility is undermined, compromising their ability 
to secure needed protection and services.
37
 Formulating law and 
 
 34. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (LexisNexis 2006); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 563.033 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (WEST 2006). Wyoming‘s statute is 
the most prescriptive, admitting expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome but defining 
Battered Woman Syndrome as ―a subset under the diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
established in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III-Revised of the 
American Psychiatric Association.‖ WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203 (2009) (LexisNexis). Despite 
the language of these statutes, Sue Osthoff & Holly Maguigan have written that ―the move 
beyond the limitations of [Battered Woman‘s Syndrome] is significant,‖ with experts more 
likely to testify on battering and its effects than Battered Woman Syndrome itself. Sue Osthoff 
& Holly Maguigan, Explaining without Pathologizing: Testimony on Battering and Its Effects, 
in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 225, 236–37 (Donileen R. Loseke et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2005). Nonetheless, statutory schemes like Wyoming‘s would seem to preclude 
testimony that strayed too far from the traditional understanding of Battered Woman Syndrome. 
 35. Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?, supra note 10, at 91. 
 36. Id. at 113–14. 
 37. Id. at 119. 
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policy around the paradigmatic victim excludes far too many women 
from protection. An anti-essentialist reframing would refocus 
domestic violence law and policy around the diversity of women who 
experience domestic violence. A reframing would ask what the law 
can do to help individual women with unique characteristics, 
prompting us to think in a more complex way about the attributes and 
needs of women who experience violence. 
The literature on domestic violence frequently asserts that the 
primary goals of any intervention should be victim safety and 
offender accountability.
38
 These are laudable goals; it would be 
difficult to argue that women who have experienced violence should 
be unsafe, or that men who batter should be able to abuse their 
partners without consequence. What frequently gets lost, however, is 
that women who experience violence may have other goals as well—
goals that they prioritize over safety or accountability at a given point 
in time. Some women want to preserve their relationships.
39
 Some 
prioritize economic security over immediate physical security.
40
 
Others may value the continued support of their families or 
communities more than holding their partners accountable.
41
 
Advocates tout ―woman-centered advocacy‖—advocacy driven by an 
individual woman‘s goals—but too often that theoretical framework 
is juxtaposed against a narrowly defined set of options for women 
who have been battered: arrest, prosecute, secure a protective order, 
 
 38. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Inaugural Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa Distinguished Jurist-
in-Residence: Lecture, 81 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 743, 753 (2007); Jennifer Gentile Long & 
Viktoria Kristiansson, Taking a Process-Oriented Approach to Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions, PROSECUTION, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 14; Judy Harris Kluger, Chief of Policy and 
Planning, New York State Courts, Domestic Violence Courts: Overview, http://www.courts. 
state.ny.us/courts/problem_solving/dv/home.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2009). 
 39. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, EXPANDING SOLUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
POVERTY: WHAT BATTERED WOMEN WITH ABUSED CHILDREN NEED FROM THEIR ADVOCATES 
7 (2000); Lynn Ingrid Nelson, Community Solutions to Domestic Violence Must Address 
Cultural Roots and Beliefs, ASSEMBLING THE PIECES, Winter 2002, at 2. 
 40. For a description of the economic difficulties facing women who leave their abusive 
partners, see Barbara J. Hart, Economics and Domestic Violence, in WHY DOESN‘T SHE JUST 
LEAVE? REAL WOMEN, REAL STORIES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 19–22 
(Heather Stark & Emilee Watturs eds., 2008). 
 41. See Yuki’s Story, in WHY DOESN‘T SHE JUST LEAVE? REAL WOMEN, REAL STORIES, 
id. at 88–91; Anitha Venkataramani-Kothari, Understanding South Asian Immigrant Women’s 
Experiences of Violence, in BODY EVIDENCE: INTIMATE VIOLENCE AGAINST SOUTH ASIAN 
WOMEN IN AMERICA 11, 14 (Shamita Das Dasgupta ed., 2007). 
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go to a shelter, get a divorce. Such a cramped conception of advocacy 
does not provide women with real choices. Only by expanding our 
understanding of the diversity of women‘s goals can we create 
meaningful interventions for women who have been battered. 
III. FORMULATE POLICY AROUND THE EXPERIENCES OF 
MARGINALIZED WOMEN 
Domestic violence law and policy assumes a stereotypical victim 
who is white, straight, and middle-class.
42
 Not coincidentally, much 
of the leadership of the early battered women‘s movement was also 
white, straight, and middle-class.
43
 This leadership appealed to white, 
straight, middle-class men in positions of power to enact legislation 
and fund programs to serve women who had been battered.
44
 Women 
of color protested their exclusion from policymaking early on,
45
 but 
those cries fell largely on deaf ears, the concerns of marginalized 
women pushed to the side in favor of political expediency.  
White, straight, middle-class women are better positioned to 
access resources to address domestic violence and secure the 
assistance of the court system. While all women who allege violence 
face some skepticism, the system is more culturally disposed to 
believe the claims of white, heterosexual, economically secure 
women.
46
 Women facing the barriers of poverty, racism, and 
heterosexism, by contrast, are disadvantaged in their dealings with 
police and courts. Gender bias task force reports confirm that while 
all women who experience violence find their credibility sharply 
questioned when they seek assistance, none face greater skepticism, 
if not outright hostility, than women of color.
47
 The literature on 
 
 42. Supra note 35. 
 43. Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the 
Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 282 
(1997). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE 
50, 54 (Natalie J. Sokoloff with Christina Pratt eds., 2005). 
 46.  Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?, supra note 10, at 
100, 107–09. 
 47. See Ronald L. Ellis & Lynn Hecht Schafran, Achieving Race and Gender Fairness in 
the Courtroom, in THE JUDGE‘S BOOK 91, 113 (Alfred J. DiBona, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1994); see also 
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domestic violence is replete with stories of negative treatment of 
lesbians by police, judges, and court personnel.
48
 In sociologist Claire 
Renzetti‘s groundbreaking study, only two percent of lesbians who 
had been battered responded that they would find the legal system or 
courts helpful in addressing the abuse.
49
 Moreover, women of color 
and lesbians may be reluctant to turn to systems with a history of 
mistreating their partners and communities.
50
 Domestic violence law 
and policy is unresponsive to the needs of low-income communities, 
failing to provide economic stability for women who, by leaving 
abusive relationships, imperil their daily existence.
51
 The system 
relies upon intermediaries (lawyers) who are more readily accessible 
to women with economic power.
52
 Women with lawyers are far more 
successful in their dealings with the legal system.
53
 Despite the 
relative advantages of straight white women and the clear challenges 
faced by those who fail to conform to the victim stereotype, domestic 
violence law and policy largely has been built around the needs of 
that paradigmatic victim. 
 
Shamita Das Dasgupta, Battered South Asian Women in U.S. Courts, in BODY EVIDENCE, supra 
note 41, at 211, 219. 
 48. Sandra E. Lundy, Equal Protection/Equal Safety: Representing Victims of Same-Sex 
Partner Abuse in Court, in SAME-SEX DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 43, 44 
(Beth Leventhal & Sandra E. Lundy eds., 1999). 
 49. CLAIRE M. RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN 
RELATIONSHIPS 124 (1992). 
 50. See Jo-Ellen Asbury, African-American Women in Violent Relationships: An 
Exploration of Cultural Differences, in VIOLENCE IN THE BLACK FAMILY: CORRELATES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 89, 100 (Robert L. Hampton ed., 1987) (pointing to African-American 
women's reluctance to expose African-American men to ―ridicule‖ as a reason for their silence); 
Mary Lou Dietrich, Nothing Is the Same Anymore, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT 
ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING 155, 159 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986) (describing pressure in the 
lesbian community not to air problems in relationships); Carolyn M. West, Domestic Violence 
in Ethnically and Racially Diverse Families: The “Political Gag Order” Has Been Lifted, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS, supra note 45, at 157, 158 (referring to community 
pressure not to speak out on intimate partner violence as a ―political gag order‖). 
 51. See generally Hart, supra note 40, at 19–22 (describing the economic barriers to 
leaving a violent relationship). 
 52. E.g., Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers 
and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 499, 511 (2003) 
(explaining that a ―lack of legal representatives in [Civil Protective Order] proceedings makes it 
difficult for litigants to understand and complete the process‖; the study found that being 
represented by an attorney ―substantially increased the rate of success in obtaining a protection 
order.‖).  
 53. Id. 
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Professor Donna Coker and others have suggested that the focus 
of domestic violence policy must change to accommodate the needs 
of the neediest women who experience violence. Coker writes, 
―[L]aw and policy that is developed from the experiences of a generic 
category ‗battered women,‘ is likely to reflect the needs and 
experiences of more economically advantaged women and white 
women, and is unlikely to meet the needs of poor women and women 
of color.‖54 The solution, then, is to refocus our system on the needs 
of women of color, poor women, and women from other 
marginalized communities, and to create policies and programs that 
help them address violence in ways that are attentive to the contexts 
of their lives. As Lee Jacobs Riggs writes about rape reform: 
A successful anti-rape movement will focus not only on how 
rape upholds male supremacy, but also on how it serves as a 
tool to maintain white supremacy and myriad other oppressive 
systems. When this is done, the importance of creating 
alternative ways to address violence becomes more apparent, 
and the state-sponsored systems that reproduce inequality seem 
less viable options for true transformative change.
55
 
IV. STOP DEMONIZING MEN WHO BATTER 
Just as women who experience violence are more than the 
experience of violence, men who batter are more than simply 
batterers. To acknowledge the complexity of men who batter is not to 
excuse or justify their behavior. But researchers have begun to 
distinguish among men who batter. Building on work by Amy 
Holtzworth-Monroe, Neil Jacobson, John Gottman and others, 
sociologist Michael Johnson categorizes men who batter as 
dependent intimate terrorists (men who are obsessed with their 
partners and desperate to hold and control them) and antisocial 
intimate terrorists (men who generally are violent and are willing to 
 
 54. Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A 
Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 811–12 (2001). 
 55. Lee Jacobs Riggs, A Love Letter from an Anti-Rape Activist to Her Feminist Sex-Toy 
Store, in YES MEANS YES: VISIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL POWER & A WORLD WITHOUT RAPE 
107, 111 (Jaclyn Friedman & Jessica Valenti eds., 2008). 
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use violence to have their way, at home and elsewhere).
56
 While our 
understanding of men who batter is not terribly deep, and more ―data 
from men to more precisely determine what motivates them to be 
abusive‖57 is certainly needed, we have the seeds from which to 
develop more individually tailored interventions with men who 
batter.  
The remedies we currently employ to address men‘s violent 
behavior—incarceration and batterer intervention treatment—are not 
particularly effective and fail to distinguish among men who batter. 
The evidence on the effectiveness of certified batterer intervention 
programs, as distinct from generic anger management programs, 
which are not appropriate in cases involving domestic violence, is 
mixed at best. A review of studies of batterer intervention programs 
recently found that forty percent of men who batter are successfully 
non-violent after they receive treatment. But thirty-five percent are 
successfully non-violent without undergoing treatment.
58
 In some 
cases, batterer intervention programs exacerbate an already bad 
situation. One rural Ohio woman described her experience with her 
partner‘s batterer treatment program:  
He had to go to domestic violence counseling every Monday 
for six months, but sending him to that counseling meant that I 
got beat every Monday night for six months. Because he would 
come home madder than hell because he had to go to that 
place. . . . I told the judge, ―I don‘t care what you do to him, 
but don‘t send him to counseling.‖ And she sent him back 
there anyway. So every Monday for six more months I got 
beaten because he had to go for three hours and sit in class. . . . 
And then we meet up with a few of the guys from his class and 
I think they all did it. Because they were all mad every 
Monday night and a few of the women I talked to, they‘re like, 
 
 56. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 32. 
 57. WALTER S. DEKESEREDY & MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, DANGEROUS EXITS: ESCAPING 
ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN RURAL AMERICA 96 (2009). 
 58. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 78. See also Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer 
Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 644–46 (2004–05) (surveying 
research on batterer intervention programs). 
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―Yep, they come in extra mad because it‘s your fault we have 
to be there.‖59  
She called counseling, ―the worst help ever.‖60  
The most frequently employed alternative to treatment is 
criminalization, but there is no strong evidence that criminalization 
deters men who batter from committing further acts of violence, even 
for the small percentage of men who are incarcerated for any 
appreciable period of time.
61
  
Essentializing men who batter is as problematic as essentializing 
women who are battered; both allow judges and legislators to rely on 
stereotypes in making policy, resulting in policies that are not 
responsive to the needs of the individuals who come within the 
system. In fact, essentializing men who batter reinforces problematic 
stereotypes about women who have been abused. If the man who 
batters is evil, the woman who is abused must be angelic to satisfy 
the stock narrative and be deemed worthy of the legal system‘s 
protection. Because few women can live up to that ideal, stereotyping 
men who batter ultimately may deprive women who have been 
abused of the protection and assistance they need. 
Men who batter may be motivated to change. Change, defined as 
curbing a man‘s abusive behaviors, should be an important goal of 
any intervention, since his violent behavior is what brings the man to 
the attention of the legal system.
62
 Change is distinct from 
accountability (holding a man responsible for his violence, ordinarily 
through counseling or incarceration), a frequent theme in domestic 
violence law and policy. Change could be motivated by a number of 
factors, including immigration status, employment, jail time, 
children, or maintaining intimate relationships. But laws and policies 
 
 59. DEKESEREDY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 57, at 90–91 (second alteration in original). 
 60. Id. at 91. 
 61. Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research: 
Part II: Prosecution 39–40 (2008) (explaining that simply prosecuting does not deter further 
abuse; abuse is deterred somewhat only when very intrusive sentences, including ―jail, work 
release, electronic monitoring and/or probation‖ are imposed). See also Alyce D. LAVIOLETTE 
& OLA W. BARNETT, IT COULD HAPPEN TO ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY 57 (2d 
ed. 2000) (citing studies on the lack of a link between arrest and deterrence). Klein explains that 
convictions leading to incarceration vary widely among jurisdictions, but are more likely in 
those jurisdictions with specialized domestic violence courts. Klein, supra note 61, at 42–44. 
 62. See Goodmark, supra note 58, at 646–47. 
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that paint all men who batter with the same brush neither probe what 
prompts men to change nor use such information to develop more 
meaningful (and ultimately effective) responses.
63
 Demonizing men 
who batter prompts simplistic, rhetorically appealing, but hollow ―jail 
them all‖ laws and policies. Such responses are unrealistic, 
particularly given how little jail time men who are convicted of 
battering actually serve,
64
 and are unlikely to prompt behavioral 
change. They do, however, allow policymakers to ignore the 
complexity of why men batter and avoid the question of how to stop 
abusive behavior. 
V. ELIMINATE MANDATORY POLICIES 
Mandatory policies preclude the legal system from being able to 
respond contextually to the needs of individual women. The legal 
system has embraced a number of mandatory policies in domestic 
violence cases, including mandatory arrest,
65
 no-drop prosecution,
66
 
and bans on mediation in civil cases.
67
 Most of these policies are 
justified on safety grounds and reflect the belief that once a woman 
has been battered, she is no longer capable of making an autonomous 
choice about having her partner arrested, assisting with prosecution, 
or participating in mediation.
68
 Her request that police not arrest her 
partner and her decision to drop charges against her partner are seen 
as tainted by the control that her partner must have exerted over her 
 
 63. Research suggests, for example, that feminist cognitive therapy may be more effective 
with antisocial intimate terrorists, and psychodynamic therapy more successful with dependent 
intimate terrorists. Daniel G. Saunders, Feminist-Cognitive-Behavioral and Process-
Psychodynamic Treatments for Men Who Batter: Interaction of Abuser Traits and Treatment 
Model, 11 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 393, 393 (1996). 
 64. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 71 (1992). See also Klein, supra note 61, at 55–57 (discussing 
variability in rates of imposition of and lengths of sentences involving incarceration). 
 65. For a description of mandatory arrest policies, see EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. 
BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 126 (3d ed. 2003). 
 66. For a description of no-drop prosecution policies, see id. at 194. 
 67. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/607.1 (2008) (prohibiting court from ordering 
mediation in cases in which there is evidence of domestic violence); MD. CODE ANN., Family 
Law 9–205 (LexisNexis 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-301 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
09.1-02 (2004); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West 2000). 
 68. Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 3, at 34. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy 53 
 
 
to achieve his desired outcome.
69
 Women who have been battered are 
seen as too fragile and susceptible to fear to mediate with their 
partners, too likely to capitulate under the pressure of being near 
them.
70
 Once a woman has experienced domestic violence, she 
somehow becomes incapable of rationality—with rational defined as 
making the choice that system actors believe she should make.
71
 
Setting aside the suspect notion that anyone ever acts completely 
autonomously (all of us—even those of us whose rationality is not 
being challenged—make contextual decisions influenced by family, 
community, cultural, religious, and other concerns), the prevailing 
view of women who have been battered seems to be that whenever 
they make an ―irrational‖ choice, that choice has necessarily been 
influenced at best, coerced at worst, by their abusive partners. 
This paternalism is problematic, particularly given the social 
scientific research suggesting that women who have been battered 
use arrest and prosecution instrumentally, but not necessarily to 
achieve the incarceration of their partners.
72
 Instead, women may use 
decisions about pursuing criminal sanctions to secure promises to 
change from their partners, gain leverage in future violent situations, 
or force concessions in divorce and custody proceedings.
73
 When 
mandatory policies operate on women who do not want to participate 
in the legal system, the results can be disastrous. Prosecutors 
regularly seek arrest warrants for victims of violence who are 
unwilling to testify against their abusers.
74
 Recently, at the request of 
prosecutors in Baltimore, Maryland, a judge issued a warrant that 
would jail a woman who was six months pregnant until just before 
her due date.
75
 Her crime? Being unwilling to cooperate in the 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 72. 
 72. David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering 
Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 313, 318 (1991). 
 73. Id. See also Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable Differences: Battered 
Women, Police, and the Law, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 96, 108 (N. Zoe Hilton 
ed., 1993). 
 74. David A. Ford, Coercing Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 18 
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prosecution of her child‘s father.76 As with other women who have 
been arrested for failing to respond to prosecutors‘ subpoenas or 
prosecuted for perjuring themselves in proceedings they never 
wanted brought, it seems highly unlikely that this woman will ever 
seek the assistance of the legal system again. Mandatory policies not 
only deprive women of choice, they punish women for making 
choices that the system refuses to sanction, substituting the power of 
the state for the power of the abusive partner. An anti-essentialist 
system would create room for a variety of choices concerning arrest, 
prosecution, mediation, and other options by rejecting the notion that 
all women must comply with the system‘s expectations. 
VI. RELEGATE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO A MORE LIMITED ROLE 
Not every social problem can or should be solved by the legal 
system. As Ann Scales notes, ―[l]awyers have learned to view a legal 
dispute as the beginning and end of a controversy. But that is usually 
not true.‖77 The justification for invoking the legal system in 
domestic violence matters is that these actions are violations of 
criminal law. For years, advocates for women who had been battered 
argued that intimate partner assaults should be treated just as stranger 
assaults, rejecting the notion that the legal system‘s response to 
violence should be different in cases where the perpetrator and victim 
were involved in an intimate relationship.
78
 But that intimate 
relationship is precisely what makes these crimes different—context 
is everything. Women who have been battered and their partners are 
bound together in multiple ways: economically; by their children; 
through extended family, community relationships, and cultural ties; 
and by love. In some immigrant communities, seeking protection 
from the legal system simply is not acceptable; immigrant women 
who choose this course find themselves ostracized from their only 
sources of support.
79
 In rural communities, the only help available 
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may be difficult to access or, worse, staffed by members of an ―ol‘ 
boys network‖ unwilling to arrest or prosecute their friends.80 These 
contexts color the goals and choices of women who have been 
battered; they help to make sense of what seems inexplicable, 
providing answers to questions like ―why doesn‘t she leave?‖81 We 
may not like the ways in which these factors constrain women‘s 
choices. Until those constraints are removed, however, we need to 
understand that women are making rational, contextual decisions 
about how they want to address the violence, and that sometimes 
those decisions mean opting out of the legal system. 
In the early years of the battered women‘s movement, using the 
legal system to combat domestic violence seemed an obvious choice. 
No other mechanism seemed as well equipped to provide women 
with safety. No other system had tools designed to coerce non-
violence or to hold men accountable for their violence. For some 
women, the system has kept its promise—the criminal law and 
criminally enforceable civil law have worked together to ensure that 
women are safe from further abuse and to send the message, both to 
the individual perpetrator and to society, that violence against women 
will not be tolerated. But the system has not worked, and cannot 
work, for all women. The goals and methods of the system do not 
mirror the goals of some women who have been battered. The system 
operates in ways that undermine women‘s autonomy. Many men who 
batter are not deterred by the possibility of legal action. The legal 
system is not responsive to certain claims and certain women. 
Relying on the legal system has enabled us as a society to believe that 
something has been done about domestic violence. But as Professor 
Spinak noted in the context of dependency court reform, while we 
might have done something, it is not clear what we actually have 
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accomplished,
82
 particularly for those women who cannot or will not 
deploy the state against their partners. 
We should not turn our backs on the last forty years of domestic 
violence legal reform. Creating that framework was an essential step 
in developing a societal response to domestic violence and expanding 
the options for women who have been battered. The existence of that 
framework has given women who seek to address violence from 
within their relationships, without external assistance, a powerful 
tool.
83
 Instead, we should consider whether those reforms are 
consistent with the principles I have articulated, keeping those which 
continue to hold promise under an anti-essentialist framework (e.g., 
protective orders with a variety of options) and jettisoning those, like 
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, that do not. The legal 
system should exist as an option for those women who are interested 
in using it, but should never be imposed on those who are not. For 
women who are seeking assistance but are unwilling to engage the 
legal system, we must begin to develop a community-based menu of 
options for addressing violence. Only through this anti-essentialist 
reframing of domestic violence law and policy can we ensure that 
women who have been battered will have the ability to make choices 
based on their own priorities, goals, and life circumstances. And 
finally, we should acknowledge that sometimes, the legal system has 
little or nothing to offer women who have been battered, and that we 
need to look beyond that system for solutions. Sometimes ensuring 
access to justice means walking away from the justice system. 
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